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Abstract
Background: At the end of the eleven-year conflict in Sierra Leone, a wide range of policies were implemented to
address both demand- and supply-side constraints within the healthcare system, which had collapsed during the
conflict. This study examines the extent to which households’ exposure to financial risks associated with seeking
healthcare evolved in post-conflict Sierra Leone.
Method: This study uses the 2003 and 2011 cross-sections of the Sierra Leone Integrated Household Survey to
examine changes in catastrophic health expenditure between 2003 and 2011. An Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
approach is used to quantify the extent to which changes in catastrophic health expenditure are attributable to
changes in the distribution of determinants (distributional effect) and to changes in the impact of these
determinants on the probability of incurring catastrophic health expenditure (coefficient effect).
Results: The incidence of catastrophic health expenditure decreased significantly by 18% from approximately 50%
in 2003 t0 32% in 2011. The decomposition analysis shows that this decrease represents net effects attributable to
the distributional and coefficient effects of three determinants of catastrophic health expenditure – ill-health, the
region in which households reside and the type of health facility used. A decrease in the incidence of ill-health and
changes in the regional location of households contributed to a decrease in catastrophic health expenditure. The
distributional effect of health facility types observed as an increase in the use of public health facilities, and a
decrease in the use of services in facilities owned by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also contributed to a
decrease in the incidence of catastrophic health expenditure. However, the coefficient effect of public health
facilities and NGO-owned facilities suggests that substantial exposure to financial risk remained for households
utilizing both types of health facilities in 2011.
Conclusion: The findings support the need to continue expanding current demand-side policies in Sierra Leone to
reduce the financial risk of exposure to ill health.
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Background
Direct payment made by patients at the point of care
(out-of-pocket payment) is the major source of financing
health care in low income countries [1]. In addition to
deterring access to healthcare services, the risks of in-
curring catastrophic health expenditure due to out-of-
pocket payments are well documented [2–4]. Using two
cross-sections (2003 and 2011) of the Sierra Leone Inte-
grated Household Survey (SLIHS), this study investigates
changes in the incidence of catastrophic health expend-
iture in post-conflict Sierra Leone. Following previous
studies, for examples [3, 5], catastrophic health expend-
iture is defined as health expenditure exceeding 10% of
household total expenditure. This threshold represents
the point above which household living standards are be-
lieved to be compromised by out-of-pocket health ex-
penditure either through the diversion of financial
resources from food and basic necessities, through the
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depletion of savings and assets or through the accumula-
tion of debt [6]. Health expenditure shares below the
threshold are indicative of households’ ability to smooth
consumption when faced with unexpected out-of-pocket
payments. However, this is only true for households using
healthcare services. Health expenditure share may also fall
below this threshold if healthcare is needed but not used
due to an inability to pay or other access constraint. Given
the economic consequences of health shocks [7, 8], pos-
sibly worsened by delaying or not seeking healthcare, the
measure of catastrophic health expenditure described in
this study only partly captures the true extent of financial
risks facing households.
Review of the literature on the determinants of
catastrophic health expenditure
In recent years, the emphasis has shifted from simply es-
timating the extent of catastrophic health expenditure
within populations to understanding socioeconomic fac-
tors that explain variations in households’ exposure to
healthcare financial risks. Studies using household-level
data have consistently shown strong correlations be-
tween a range of household socio-demographic charac-
teristics and the incidence of catastrophic health
expenditure. For example, the incidence of catastrophic
health expenditure is correlated with health care need –
households with a larger proportion of elderly members
or children under the age of five are more likely to incur
catastrophic health expenditure [9–12]. Household loca-
tion (rural vs. urban), as well as types of healthcare ser-
vice used (inpatient vs. outpatient care) and type of
health facility (private vs. public) are correlated with the
risk of incurring catastrophic health expenditure [9–11,
13, 14]. Depending on the design features (for example,
levels of co-payments, types of benefit package and pay-
ment-provider mechanisms), enrolment into health
insurance schemes has been shown to either increase
protection against catastrophic health expenditure [9,
14, 15], to have a limited effect or to increase the
risk of incurring catastrophic health expenditure [10–
12, 16, 17].
These studies provide insights into factors that protect
households or increase their vulnerability to catastrophic
health expenditure and are useful in informing targeted
policy decisions. Therefore, in addition to estimating
trends in the incidence of catastrophic health expend-
iture, this paper quantifies the extent to which temporal
changes in the determinants of catastrophic health ex-
penditure, including household characteristics and
healthcare-seeking behaviours, contributed to changes in
the incidence of catastrophic health expenditure in Si-
erra Leone. Temporal changes in the incidence of cata-
strophic health expenditure can occur either through a
change in the distribution of determinants or through a
change in the impact of these determinants. The
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition approach [18, 19] is ap-
plied to disentangle these two effects into a distribu-
tional effect component, which describes changes
attributable to differences in the distribution of charac-
teristics and a coefficient effect component, which de-
scribes changes attributable to differences in the impact
of these characteristics. Each effect is estimated while
holding the other constant.
Health financing policies in post-conflict Sierra Leone
Historically, Sierra Leone has ranked as one of the poor-
est countries in the world, an economic situation made
worse by the eleven-year (1991–2002) conflict. The con-
flict was characterized by extensive destruction of life
and property, a contraction of the economy and the
collapse of public infrastructure across the country. Ap-
proximately 2 million people were displaced during the
conflict and at the end of the conflict in 2002, an esti-
mated 50,000 people had been killed out of a population
of 4.4 million [20, 21].
Although Sierra Leone still lags behind other sub-
Saharan African countries in terms of its health and eco-
nomic indicators [22], some progress has been made
since 2002 to rebuild the economy following the end of
the conflict [23]. Between 2003 and 2011, the economy
grew by 2.5% while the proportion of households living
below the poverty line fell by approximately 13%, from
66.4% in 2003 to 52.9% in 2011 [24]. These gains have
been felt more in rural areas and in the Northern and
Eastern regions where the conflict had been most in-
tense [24].
In the aftermath of the conflict, several policies were
implemented to strengthen the health system. In order
to increase responsiveness to local needs in pre-conflict
marginalized areas, a Local Government Act was passed
in 2004 to decentralize some central government
functions (including healthcare provision) to local
councils [25, 26]. This contributed to the widespread
reconstruction and refurbishment of public healthcare
facilities nationwide and an increase in access to
healthcare services [25].
In 2006, a cost-recovery scheme was reintroduced fol-
lowing a failed attempt to fully implement one in 2002
[27]. The aim of the scheme was to generate revenue
within public health facilities and ensure uninterrupted
supply of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies, thus
minimizing disruptions to the provision of healthcare
services.
In 2010, the Government of Sierra Leone launched a
Free Healthcare Initiative (FHCI) aimed at increasing ac-
cess to health services among vulnerable populations
[28]. Under the FHCI, user fees were waived in public
health facilities for children under the age of five years,
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pregnant women and mothers of young babies (‘lactat-
ing’). In addition, wider health sector reforms were im-
plemented alongside the launch of the FHCI in 2010 to
strengthen supply-side functions of the health system.
These included salary uplift to motivate healthcare
workers, as well as fast-track recruitment and deploy-
ment of health workers to underserved areas. Other
supply-side reforms where aimed at strengthening the
procurement and supply chain management system to
ensure uninterrupted supply of medical supplies and
equipment to healthcare facilities [28, 29].
These reforms are likely to have important implica-
tions for households’ healthcare-seeking behaviours and
exposure to healthcare financial risks. For example, the
reintroduction of the cost-recovery scheme and user
charges in public health facilities can have an effect on
households through two possible routes. First, the fall in
the use of public healthcare services by some users as a
result of higher charges [30, 31] reduces catastrophic
spending at the cost of impairing access. Second, for
remaining users, the higher charges increase the likeli-
hood of catastrophic health expenditure. The decompos-
ition approach captures both effects, the first as a
distributional effect since post cost-recovery, the use of
facilities changes and the second as a coefficient effect
due to the change in the impact of facility-use on cata-
strophic health expenditure.
Therefore this paper offers an advantage over previous
studies by providing insights not only into the associ-
ation between household characteristics and the inci-
dence of catastrophic health expenditure but also into
the extent to which wider healthcare sector reforms, im-
plemented during the study period and affecting house-
hold healthcare-seeking behaviours, may have changed
households’ susceptibility to healthcare financial risks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2
outlines the SLIHS, study variables and the Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition approach; the results are pre-
sented and discussed in sections 3 and 4 respectively;
and the final section concludes the paper.
Methods
Data
Sierra Leone integrated household survey (SLIHS)
The SLIHS is a cross-sectional national representative
sample of households in Sierra Leone conducted in 2003
and 2011 to track changes in household living standards
and wellbeing. In both surveys, households were selected
using comparable sampling strategies. Sierra Leone is di-
vided into four provinces and 14 districts. Each district
is in turn sub-divided into lower administrative units:
first into local councils (19), then chiefdoms (149) and
sections (1322). Each section is further sub-divided into
area units known as enumeration areas (EAs), which
formed the primary sampling unit of the SLIHS. House-
holds were selected from a sample of EAs in a two
stage-sampling process: first, EAs were stratified into
rural and urban areas and a random sample of EAs se-
lected to ensure a representative number of households
from urban and rural areas. A random sample of house-
holds was then drawn from selected EAs.
In 2011, approximately 6800 households were selected.
However, due to financial and human resource con-
straints, a significantly smaller sample of households
(approximately 3700) was interviewed in the 2003
survey.
Health expenditure
In both years, data on health expenditure were collected
using a health questionnaire completed by heads of
households on behalf of all household members. The
health questionnaire collected data on the use of in- and
outpatient health services from both formal and infor-
mal service providers as well as expenditure incurred in
using these services. Heads of households were asked to
report on the use of healthcare services by any house-
hold member in a two- or four-week period1 (recall pe-
riods) prior to the interview date, and any out-of-pocket
expenditure incurred as a result. Both years varied in
some components of health expenditure and recall pe-
riods over which data were collected – a summary is
provided in Table 1. For example, in 2011, for inpatient
services (hospital charges, medicines and medical sup-
plies), heads of households were asked to report on util-
isation of any service 4 weeks prior to the interview date
and out-of-pocket expenditure incurred as a result.
However, in 2003, household heads reported on in-
patient service-use in the 2 weeks preceding the
Table 1 Household total expenditure components
Household Expenditure Recall Period
2003 2011
Health Expenditure 2 weeks 2 weeks
• Outpatient services:
Consultation charges; transportation
fee; prescription charges*
• Inpatient services: 2 weeks 4 weeks
Consultation and admission charges
• Medicines & medical supplies,
including over-the-counter
medications
2 weeks 4 weeks
Food Expenditure 3–12 months 25 days**
Non-food Expenditure
• Frequent purchases 3–12 months 25 days **
• Infrequent purchases 12 months 12 months
*Prescription charges collected only in 2011
**Collected in 5-day intervals
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interview date. For consistency, 4-week expenditure data
were scaled down to a 2-week period (by dividing health
expenditure by 2). In this study, total health expenditure
is estimated as the sum of payments made for outpatient
consultation and prescription charges, transportation ex-
penditure, hospital charges as well as for medicines (in-
cluding over-the-counter medicines) and medical
supplies (Table 1).
Food and non-food expenditure
In both years, detailed information was collected on a
wide range of food and non-food goods purchased by
households. In 2003, household heads were asked to re-
port on food and frequently purchased non-food goods
bought in the 3–12 months period prior to the interview
date. To limit recall bias, a different approach was
adopted in 2011 to collect data for food and frequently
purchased non-food goods. Each household received five
visits at regular intervals over a one-month period. The
monthly food and non-food expenditure for 2011 was
estimated as the sum of all purchases made over the en-
tire month.
For infrequently purchased non-food goods and ser-
vices, expenditure data were collected over a 12-month
recall period in both 2003 and 2011 (Table 1). For com-
parability with health expenditure data, all food and non-
food expenditure was scaled down to a 2-week period by
dividing by the proportionate number of weeks.
The 2003 and 2011 surveys varied in the types of food
and non-food goods included in the survey question-
naire – some goods were included in the 2003 survey
questionnaire, but not in the 2011 survey, and vice versa.
To allow for comparability across time, only food and
non-food goods included in both years are used in esti-
mating total household expenditure. Total household ex-
penditure in each year is estimated as the sum of health,
food and non-food goods and services purchased by
each household. This is converted to United States Dol-
lars (USD) using purchasing power parity exchange
rates2 and expressed in 2005 prices.
Catastrophic health expenditure
Catastrophic health expenditure is defined as health ex-
penditure exceeding 10% of household total expenditure.
First, health expenditure share of total expenditure is es-
timated for each household and then a binary variable is
generated which equals one, when health expenditure
share of total expenditure exceeds 10%.
Study covariates
This study makes use of variables shown in previous
studies to explain variations in households’ exposure to
healthcare financial risks. These include household size,
proportion of household members below the age of
5 years and above the age of 65 years, household loca-
tion (rural/urban and West/East/South/North regions)
and proportion of unemployed adult household mem-
bers. Head of household characteristics include age (and
age squared), gender, marital status (married/ single, di-
vorced, separated, widowed), religion (Muslim/Christian,
other religion, no religion) and education (no education
to junior secondary education/some senior secondary
education and above).
In addition to household demographic characteristics,
this study uses other previously identified determinants of
catastrophic health expenditure. These include the pro-
portion of household members reporting ill health as well
as the proportion of household members utilising in-
patient and outpatient healthcare services. To investigate
differential effects of health facility-type, health service
utilisation is disaggregated by type of service. This is iden-
tified using a combination of two variables available in
SLIHS – the owner of the healthcare facility visited (public
or private) and the health worker type consulted. For out-
patient health care use, this includes use of informal
healthcare services (i.e. visits to traditional healers, spiritu-
alists or traditional birth attendants3), use of formal public
healthcare services (visits to doctors, dentists, pharma-
cists, nurses, midwives and medical assistants in
government-owned facilities) and use of formal private
healthcare services (visits to doctors, dentists, pharma-
cists, nurses, midwives and medical assistants in privately-
owned facilities). Formal private healthcare-use is further
disaggregated by privately-owned facilities and facilities
owned by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
missionaries. Given that total health expenditure is esti-
mated at the household level, the proportion of household
members utilizing each health facility-type is defined as
the number of household members utilizing a facility-type
divided by the household size.
In 2011, information on type of privately-owned in-
patient health facility was aggregated. Therefore we are
unable to distinguish between formal and informal
private inpatient healthcare-use. As a result only two
categories of inpatient health service-use are included –
the proportion of household members hospitalised in
government-owned facilities and the proportion of those
admitted into privately-owned facilities.
Our final sample consists of 1886 households in 2003
and 2800 households in 2011. These include households
with complete data on health expenditure and health
service utilisation for all household members as well as
complete data on household and head of household
characteristics.
The Oaxaca-blinder decomposition approach
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition approach [18, 19] is
a mean based decomposition method which allows
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differences in the outcomes of two mutually exclusive
groups to be decomposed into a part attributable to
group differences in the distribution (or level) of charac-
teristics (referred to as distributional effect) and a part
attributable to group differences in the impact of these
characteristics (coefficient effect). The decomposition
analysis is performed on the basis of the relationship be-
tween an outcome variable and a set of observed
characteristics:
CY ¼ XY βY þ εY ; E εYð Þ ¼ 0 Y  2003; 2011f g ð1Þ
where C is the incidence of catastrophic health expend-
iture defined as a binary variable which is equal to one
when the share of health expenditure in total household
expenditure exceeds 10%; X, is a vector of observable
household characteristics; β, a vector of the slope param-
eters including the intercept and ε, the random error
term. Given that E(εY) = 0 , the change in the incidence
of catastrophic health expenditure,△μC , can be written as:
△μC ¼ C2011−C2003 ¼ E X2011ð Þ  β2011−E X2003ð Þβ2003 ð2Þ
The decomposition of △μC is performed in two steps. In
the first instance, an aggregate decomposition analysis is
performed to identify total distributional and total coeffi-
cient effects using the three-fold decomposition ap-
proach [32, 33]:
Δb
μ
C ¼ X 2003 βb2011−βb2003
 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Δb
μ
β
þ X 2011−X 2003
 
βb2003
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Δb
μ
X
þ X 2011−X 2003
 
βb2011−βb2003
 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Δb
μ
I
ð3Þ
where X 2011 and X 2003 are the 2011 and 2003 covariate
means respectively and βbH and β
b
L are the corresponding
coefficients estimated using a linear probability model.
The first term, Δb
μ
β , is the total coefficient effect, which
represents contributions attributable to group differ-
ences in coefficients (including the intercept). The sec-
ond term, Δb
μ
X , is the distributional effect, which
represents contributions attributable to group differ-
ences in the level of characteristics estimated at the
mean. The third term, Δb
μ
I , represents an interaction be-
tween group differences in characteristics and coeffi-
cients as well as differences in residuals. Given the
ambiguity in the interpretation of the interaction term
[34], this study focuses only on interpreting the distribu-
tional and coefficient effects.
Second, a detailed decomposition is performed to
identify the contribution of each covariate to △μC , both
through changes in the level of covariate means and
changes in the magnitude of their effects. The detailed
decomposition relies on the additive linearity assump-
tion implied by eq. 1. This means that total distribu-
tional and total coefficient effects are each the sum of
the contribution of individual covariates:
Δb
μ
X ¼
X
K
k¼1
X 2011;k−X 2003;k
 
βb2003;k ð4Þ
and
Δb
μ
β ¼ βb2011;0−βb2003;0
 
þ
X
K
k¼1
βb2011k−β
b
2003;k
 
X 2003;k
ð5Þ
where k represents the kth covariate and βb2011;0 and
βb2003;0 are the estimated intercept coefficients from 2011
and 2003, respectively. For categorical covariates with
more than two categories, the result of the detailed de-
composition of the coefficient effect is dependent on the
choice of the base or omitted category. Therefore the co-
efficient effect of each categorical variable is normalised
and presented as a combined effect [32, 35].
The decomposition analysis is performed using the
STATA user-written command, ‘oaxaca’, specifying a lin-
ear probability model [36]. While ‘oaxaca’ can support a
probit or logit model specification, the linear probability
model is used given that ‘oaxaca’ applies the decompos-
ition to the linear predictions from the model [36]. This
means that ‘oaxaca’ with a logit or probit model specifi-
cation will not be expressed on a probability scale but in
terms of log odds (in the case of a logit model) or z-
scores (in the case probit models), resulting in difficul-
ties interpreting the results of the decomposition
analysis.
Results
Summary statistics
Table 2 shows the mean distribution of household char-
acteristics and estimates of the incidence of catastrophic
health expenditure in 2003 and 2011. The incidence of
catastrophic health expenditure, defined at a threshold
of 10%, decreased significantly between 2003 and 2011
by approximately 18 percentage points. Household eco-
nomic well-being improved between the two study years
– total household expenditure per capita increased,
largely driven by an increase in household food expend-
iture (Table 2).
Positive improvements are also observed with health indi-
cators. The proportion of household members reporting ill
health decreased significantly by approximately 21 percent-
age points points. In terms of household healthcare-seeking
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behaviours, the proportion of household members utilising
formal public outpatient healthcare services remained
largely unchanged. However, a higher proportion of house-
hold members utilised informal healthcare services (an in-
crease of approximately 1 percentage points) while
utilisation of formal private as well as NGO/missionary
healthcare services decreased by approximately 0.4 and 1
percentage points, respectively.
A shift is observed in the distribution of households
across Sierra Leone’s four regions (Table 2). The propor-
tion of households living in the Western and Southern
regions decreased by approximately 4, and 14 percentage
points, respectively. A corresponding increase is ob-
served with the proportions of households living in the
worst conflict-affected regions of the Eastern (an in-
crease of approximately 5 percentage points) and
Table 2 Mean Household Characteristics
2003 2011 Difference± Full Sample
Health expenditure share of total expenditure > 10% (CHE) 0.501 0.32 −0.181*** 0.41
Socioeconomic inequality in CHE ¥ 0.060 0.068*** 0.008 0.0343
Household Characteristics
Below median total expenditure 0.555 0.418 −0.137*** 0.486
Total expenditure /capita (US$) 39.87 97.63 57.76** 68.88
Food expenditure/capita (US$) 15.93 45.19 29.26*** 30.63
Non-food expenditure/capita (US$) 16.74 46.02 29.28 31.45
Health expenditure (US$) 19.92 15.03 −4.89 17.46
Food share of total expenditure 16.64 10.07 −6.56*** 13.34
Health share of total expenditure 48.27 63.49 15.22*** 55.91
Household size 5.576 5.378 −0.198† 5.477
Log household size 1.588 1.561 −0.027 1.574
Children under 5 years 0.142 0.106 −0.036*** 0.124
Adults over 65 years 0.045 0.039 −0.005 0.042
Unemployed adults 0.305 0.377 0.072*** 0.3411
Ill health 0.399 0.191 −0.208*** 0.295
Household location
Rural 0.607 0.67 0.063*** 0.639
Western region 0.188 0.15 −0.038** 0.169
Eastern region 0.239 0.284 0.045*** 0.261
Northern region 0.291 0.418 0.127*** 0.355
Southern region 0.283 0.148 −0.135*** 0.215
Health facility
Formal Public 0.090 0.095 0.005 0.092
Formal NGO & Missionary 0.012 0.004 −0.008*** 0.008
Formal Private 0.064 0.022 −0.042*** 0.043
Informal Private 0.010 0.016 0.006** 0.013
Public Hospital 0.006 0.011 0.005*** 0.008
Private Hospital 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
Head of Household Characteristics
Married 0.768 0.794 0.026 0.781
Age (years) 46.67 44.58 −2.09*** 45.62
Male 0.794 0.742 −0.052*** 0.768
Muslim 0.718 0.779 0.061*** 0.749
No education 0.825 0.838 0.013 0.832
Observations 1886 2800 4686
†p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, ± estimated using student’s T-test, ¥this is estimated as the concentration index
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Northern regions (an increase of approximately 13 per-
centage points) [37]. The concentration index is positive
for both years (0.06 and 0.068), although it is statistically
significant for only 2011 suggesting that catastrophic
health expenditure is concentrated more amongst the
richer population (Table 2).
Regression analysis
Table 3 presents the elasticities of a series of linear prob-
ability models of the incidence of catastrophic health ex-
penditure. The elasticities represent the magnitude of
the associations between household characteristics and
the probability of incurring catastrophic health expend-
iture. Similar to previous studies [9–13], the incidence of
catastrophic health expenditure is observed to be corre-
lated with a wide range of household characteristics and
healthcare-seeking behaviours. In the pooled data (2003
and 2011), the probability of incurring catastrophic
health expenditure increases with household size, the in-
cidence of illness and with the use of formal and infor-
mal health care services. For example, a 1 percent
increase in household size increases the probability of
incurring catastrophic health expenditure by approxi-
mately 14 percentage points.
Compared to households located in the Western re-
gion, households in other regions were more likely to
experience financial risks associated with seeking health-
care. For example, the probability of incurring cata-
strophic health expenditure for households living in the
Eastern region is approximately 7 percentage points
higher than households in the Western region.
The pooled cross-sections, while providing useful in-
sights into the determinants of catastrophic health ex-
penditure, mask important changes that occurred over
time and the resulting implications for households’ ex-
posure to financial risks. A comparison of coefficient es-
timates between 2003 and 2011 shows that the
magnitude and direction of effect vary between the two
years (Table 3). For example, in 2003 households located
in the Eastern, Southern and Northern regions were less
likely to incur catastrophic health expenditure compared
to households in the Western region (by approximately
15, 11 and 15 percentage points, respectively). However
in 2011, this effect is reversed with households in the
other regions more likely to incur catastrophic health
expenditure compared to households in the Western re-
gion. This is especially true for households located in the
Southern region where the probability of incurring cata-
strophic health expenditure is approximately 13 percent-
age points higher compared to the Western region.
In both years, the incidence of ill health is associated
with a higher probability of incurring catastrophic health
expenditure; however, the magnitude of the effect is sig-
nificantly lower in 2011 (by approximately 0.2
percentage points). Similarly, the use of any healthcare
facility is associated with a higher probability of incur-
ring catastrophic health expenditure. However in 2011,
the magnitude of this effect is higher for formal public
outpatient healthcare services by approximately 0.3 per-
centage points.
Oaxaca-blinder decomposition analysis
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition analysis (Table 4)
quantifies the extent to which changes in mean and
coefficients (elasticities) of characteristics described
above contributed to the observed decrease in the in-
cidence of catastrophic health expenditure (or CHE
gap). The aggregate decomposition (top panel, Table 4)
shows that both changes in mean distribution of char-
acteristics (total distributional effect) and to a lesser
degree, changes in the impact of these characteristics
(total coefficient effect) contributed significantly to
the CHE gap.
Total distributional effect is largely driven by changes
in the mean distribution4 of ill health (which contributed
75% to the total distributional effect), changes in re-
gional distribution of households (which contributed 8%
to the total distributional effect) and changes in the dis-
tribution of formal private and NGO/missionary health
facilities (which contributed 14% and 3%, respectively to
the total distributional effect) (middle panel, Table 4).
Total coefficient effect is largely driven by changes in
the impact of ill health; however, regional variations in
the incidence of catastrophic health expenditure as well
as changes in the impact of public healthcare service-use
have counteracting effects (Fig. 1).
Robustness check
The robustness of these findings is tested using different
thresholds for defining catastrophic health expenditure
(Table 5). The CHE gap is observed to be narrower at
higher thresholds. The detailed decomposition shows
that while the distributional effects are largely robust to
the threshold used, the precision of coefficient effect es-
timates vary with threshold.
Discussion
Following the end of the brutal civil conflict in Sierra
Leone, the health sector underwent a series of reforms
aimed at strengthening both demand- and supply-side
functions of the health system. These include the devo-
lution of administrative responsibilities and funds to
local councils in 2004; the reintroduction of the cost-
recovery scheme and user fees in public health facilities
in 2006; the Free Health Care Initiative (FHCI) in 2010
and the accompanying human resources for health
(HRH) reformsand widespread reconstruction and refur-
bishment of public healthcare facilities nationwide [25–
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Table 3 Linear probability model of catastrophic health expenditure (defined at a threshold of 10%) showing marginal effects
Model Covariates 2003 2011 Difference±± Pooled
Below median expenditure 0.0444 0.00998 −0.0344 0.0261
(0.028) (0.019) (0.037) (0.017)
Married 0.0773 −0.0211 −0.0984† 0.0233
(0.048) (0.025) (0.051) (0.025)
Age (years) 0.00243 −0.00477 −0.00720 −0.00167
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003)
Age squared −0.0000192 0.0000526 0.0000718 0.0000238
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male −0.0185 0.0144 0.0329 0.00716
(0.044) (0.022) (0.043) (0.021)
Muslim 0.0330 −0.00354 −0.0366 0.0157
(0.029) (0.021) (0.036) (0.018)
No education −0.00278 0.00817 0.0110 0.00304
(0.040) (0.025) (0.041) (0.024)
Log household size 0.157*** 0.138*** −0.0183 0.142***
(0.024) (0.018) (0.031) (0.015)
Children under 5 years −0.000669 −0.000710 −0.0000406 −0.000550
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Adults over 65 years 0.00124 0.00120 −0.0000386 0.000899
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Unemployed adults −0.000492 −0.000110 0.000382 −0.000274
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ill health 0.00504*** 0.00329*** −0.00175** 0.00456***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Rural 0.00642 0.00855 0.00212 0.0115
(0.030) (0.024) (0.045) (0.019)
Eastern region± −0.154*** −0.00530 0.149** −0.0742**
(0.052) (0.032) (0.060) (0.030)
Northern region± −0.147*** 0.0123 0.160*** −0.0650**
(0.054) (0.031) (0.059) (0.031)
Southern region± −0.106** 0.126*** 0.233*** −0.00677
(0.053) (0.036) (0.068) (0.033)
Formal Public 0.00466*** 0.00729*** 0.00263** 0.00546***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Formal NGO & Missionary 0.00462*** 0.0108*** 0.00619† 0.00597***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Formal Private 0.00483*** 0.00643*** 0.00161 0.00520***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Informal Private 0.00413*** 0.00364*** −0.000481 0.00316***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Public Hospital 0.00607** 0.00935*** 0.00328 0.00825***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Private Hospital 0.00722 −0.00475** −0.0120** −0.00233
(0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002)
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29]. Covering a time period over which these health re-
forms were implemented, this study provides insights
into the extent to which changes in household
healthcare-seeking behaviours, influenced by ongoing
health reforms and wider economic recovery contributed
to changes in households’ vulnerability to healthcare fi-
nancial risks. This study finds that the incidence of cata-
strophic health expenditure decreased significantly
between 2003 and 2011. Using an Oaxaca-Blinder de-
composition approach, we show that the observed de-
crease (or CHE gap) represents a net effect resulting
from changes in the mean distribution and impact of a
range of determinants having both contributory and/or
counteracting effects.
Changes in both the distribution and coefficient effect
of ill health between 2003 and 2011 made the largest
contribution to the CHE gap. Between 2003 and 2011,
the proportion of household members reporting ill
health decreased significantly, contributing to a reduc-
tion in the incidence of catastrophic health expenditure.
Similarly, the impact of ill health on the likelihood of in-
curring catastrophic health expenditure reduced signifi-
cantly between the two study years. In addition to severe
disruptions to livelihood, conflicts have been linked to
outbreaks of diseases, particularly infectious disease due
to disruptions in safe drinking water sources and sanita-
tion [38]. The conflict in Sierra Leone was no exception,
and was characterized by a widespread destruction of
lives and livelihood, the collapse of public infrastructure
and the displacement of millions of people [20, 21]. As
peace and security returned to Sierra Leone, public in-
frastructure were rebuilt and household livelihoods re-
established [23]. The distributional and coefficient ef-
fects possibly reflect these wider improvements in
household living and environmental conditions, resulting
in better health outcomes, reduced severity of diseases
and lower healthcare costs as a consequence.
The distributional effect of household regional loca-
tion provides further indication of general improvements
in household economies in the post-conflict period. The
distributional effect of regional location, capturing the
shift in populations from the least conflict-affected re-
gions (the Western and Southern regions) to the worst
affected regions (the Northern and Eastern regions) is
indicative of regional economic growth as peace and se-
curity returned [37, 39]. This in turn is likely to have im-
proved household economic conditions and households’
ability to cope with the associated cost of seeking health-
care services.
By contrast the regional coefficient effect, capturing
regional variations in exposure to financial risk suggests
that these positive changes may not have been felt
equally across all regions. Compared to households liv-
ing in the Western region, those in other regions were
less likely to incur catastrophic health expenditure in
2003 but more likely in 2011. Changing population dis-
tribution and accessibility of health infrastructure is
likely to explain this effect. For example, only 16 health
facilities were functioning at the height of the conflict in
1996, with the majority of these located in the Western
Region [40]. Therefore unavailability of functioning
healthcare facilities in the Eastern, Southern and North-
ern regions would have resulted in households forgoing
healthcare services in 2003. By 2011, progress had been
made in rebuilding and refurbishing health infrastruc-
ture including higher level facilities and lower level per-
ipheral health units [41]. This would have resulted in
better access and use of healthcare services across all re-
gions. However, long-standing socioeconomic variations
across regions [39, 42–44] may have limited the ability
of households, who seek healthcare in poorer regions to
cope with the costs of accessing health care services com-
pared to households in the wealthier Western region.
The distributional and coefficient effect of facility-type
provides interesting insights into the evolution of health
service provision in the post-conflict era. A statistically
significant decrease in the use of private facilities includ-
ing NGO and missionary-owned facilities is observed
Table 3 Linear probability model of catastrophic health expenditure (defined at a threshold of 10%) showing marginal effects
(Continued)
2011 (base category: 2003) - - - −0.0505***
(0.017)
Constant −0.0692 0.0131 0.0823 0.0107
(0.144) (0.081) (0.175) (0.079)
Observations 1886 2800 4686
R2 0.305 0.335 0.332
adj. R2 0.296 0.329 0.329
†p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses
±Base category: Western region
±±Standard errors estimated using 100 bootstrap replications
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between 2003 and 2011 while an increase is observed in
the use of public health facilities (although not statisti-
cally significant). In the aftermath of the conflict, NGOs
and private actors played an important role in the
provision of healthcare [45], filling the gap left by the de-
struction of public health infrastructure during the con-
flict. However, in the period covered by this study (2003
to 2011), progress had been made in rebuilding and
refurbishing public health facilities [23], thus leading to
an increase in the supply and use of these services.
The decrease in the use of formal private and NGO
healthcare services significantly reduced households’ ex-
posure to financial risk. However, those who continued
to use NGO-owned health facilities faced a higher risk
of incurring catastrophic health expenditure in 2011
(captured in the coefficient effect). An increase in prices
of healthcare services between 2003 and 2011 is likely to
explain the observed coefficient effect of NGO- and
privately-owned healthcare facilities. NGO-owned facil-
ities in Sierra Leone largely operate on a similar basis to
Table 4 Decomposing the change in catastrophic health expenditure at 10% threshold
Aggregate Decomposition
Mean
CHE 2011 32.0***
CHE 2003 50.1***
CHE gap −18.1***
Contribution Mean Percent
Distributional Effect −14.0*** 77%
Coefficient Effect −6.65*** 37%
Interaction 2.56 −14%
Detailed Decomposition
Distributional Effect Coefficient Effect Interaction Effect
Contribution Mean Percent Mean Percent Mean Percent
Below median expenditure −0.61 4% −1.91 29% 0.473 18%
Married 0.194 −1% −7.56† 114% −0.247 −10%
Age (years) −0.509 4% −33.6 505% 1.51 59%
Age squared 0.356 −3% 17.1 −257% −1.33 −52%
Male 0.0966 −1% 2.61 −39% −0.172 −7%
Muslim 0.201 −1% −2.63 40% −0.222 −9%
No education −0.004 0% 0.904 −14% 0.014 1%
Unemployed adults −0.355 3% 1.17 −18% 0.276 11%
Rural area 0.0404 0% 0.129 −2% 0.0134 1%
Region −1.14** 8% 1.25** −19% −0.427 −17%
Log household size −0.42 3% −2.9 44% 0.049 2%
Children under 5 years 0.24 −2% −0.057 1% 0.0146 1%
Adults over 65 years −0.067 0% −0.017 0% 0.0021 0%
Ill health −10.5*** 75% −6.96** 105% 3.62** 141%
Formal Public 0.234 −2% 2.35*** −35% 0.132 5%
Formal NGO & Missionary −0.384** 3% 0.741** −11% −0.515** −20%
Formal Private −2.01*** 14% 1.02 −15% −0.671 −26%
Informal Private 0.240† −2% −0.05 1% −0.028 −1%
Public Hospital 0.314† −2% 0.189 −3% 0.169 7%
Private Hospital 0.0613 0% −0.131† 2% −0.102 −4%
Constant 21.8 −328%
Total −14.0*** 100% −6.65*** 100% 2.56 100%
Observations 4686 4686 4686
†p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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privately owned facilities, charging patients a fee-for-
service at the point of care [30, 46]. Although not dir-
ectly affected by the cost-recovery policy, the introduc-
tion of user fees in public health facilities in 2006 may
have had an indirect effect on prices in private and
NGO-owned facilities. In other settings, prices in the
private health sector have been shown to be responsive
to user fee changes within the public health sector. For
example, the introduction of user fees in public facilities
in Cambodia was associated with an increase in prices in
private facilities [47] while the removal of user fees in
public facilities in Uganda was associated with a de-
crease in prices within private health facilities [48].
The distributional effect of public health services sug-
gests an increase in households’ exposure to the finan-
cial risk of seeking healthcare. While this effect was not
found to be statistically significant, the coefficient effect
provides more insight into the implication of public
health facility-use on households’ exposure to financial
risk. In both study years, the risk of incurring cata-
strophic health expenditure increased with the propor-
tion of household members using public health services.
However, this effect is significantly higher in 2011 sug-
gesting higher financial risks faced by households. This
effect may partly be explained by health financing re-
forms including the reintroduction of the cost recovery
scheme and user fees in public health facilities in 2006
which would have resulted in higher out-of-pocket
health expenditure for those utilizing these services in
2011 [2, 30, 31]. Furthermore, an increase in the range
of service options available in public health facilities as
they were rebuilt and refurbished, is likely to have re-
sulted in an increase in the quantity of services
demanded per visit, higher out-of-pocket payments and
catastrophic health expenditure, as a consequence. Al-
though through the FHCI, exemption rules and fee
waivers apply for vulnerable populations using public
health facilities, there is limited evidence on the ef-
fectiveness of these policies in protecting households
from the financial burden of healthcare. For example,
less than complete implementation and shortfalls in
medicines and supplies have limited the impact of the
FHCI for recent mothers and children under five
years [49–52].
These findings are in part, sensitive to the cata-
strophic health expenditure threshold. The CHE gap
varies between 11 and 23%, depending on the thresh-
old used for defining catastrophic health expenditure.
Nevertheless, the proportionate contribution of the
total coefficient and distributional effects to the CHE
gap at each threshold are comparable. The detailed
distributional effects appear robust to thresholds,
while the coefficient effect varies in some cases. For
example, the coefficient effect of ill health and public
health facility-use is significant only at lower thresh-
olds suggesting equal effects of these determinants in
both years at higher thresholds.
Study limitations
The robustness of our findings could be affected by the
extent of measurement errors in household expenditure
data. The precision of household expenditure estimates
from survey data is subject to recall periods over which
data are collected and the differences in how goods were
itemised between the two study years [53]. Given that
the 2003 and 2011 SLIHS differ in terms of recall pe-
riods and the goods itemised, this is likely to have impli-
cations for both estimates of total household
expenditure and estimates of the incidence of cata-
strophic expenditure. For example, longer recall periods
over which food and frequently purchased non-food ex-
penditure were collected (3–12 month in 2003 vs. 5 days
Fig. 1 Significant contributors to changes in catastrophic health expenditure between 2003 and 2011
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Table 5 Robustness check- Decomposing 2011–2003 change in catastrophic health expenditure at different thresholds
5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
2011 43.5*** 32.0*** 24.1*** 17.8*** 13.4***
2003 66.1*** 50.1*** 38.5*** 30.7*** 24.5***
CHE gap −22.6*** −18.1*** −14.4*** −12.9*** −11.1***
Distributional Effect −15.3*** −14.0*** −10.9*** −8.60*** −6.11***
Coefficient Effect −9.75*** −6.65*** −4.98** −4.73** −5.45***
Interaction 2.47 2.56 1.48 0.393 0.445
Detailed Decomposition: Distributional Effect
Below median expenditure −0.454 −0.61 −0.585 −0.438 −0.253
Married 0.136 0.194 0.288 0.187 0.151
Age (years) 0.247 −0.509 0.412 0.51 0.133
Age squared −0.0951 0.356 −0.471 −0.252 0.0814
Male −0.119 0.0966 0.32 0.342 0.186
Muslim 0.0933 0.201 0.0754 0.0157 −0.0726
No education −0.0405 −0.00354 −0.0333 0.00378 −0.0149
Unemployed adults −0.348 −0.355 −0.236 −0.42 −0.214
Rural area −0.328 0.0404 0.0175 0.00533 −0.0432
Region −0.528 −1.14** −1.36*** −2.05*** −1.81***
Log household size −0.456 −0.42 −0.267 −0.399 −0.376
Children under 5 years 0.249 0.24 0.182 0.266 0.369
Adults over 65 years −0.0913 −0.0672 −0.00296 −0.0669 −0.0438
Ill health −12.7*** −10.5*** −7.45*** −5.08*** −3.13***
Formal Public 0.133 0.234 0.304 0.31 0.307
Formal NGO & Missionary −0.281** −0.384** −0.540*** −0.481** −0.411**
Formal Private −1.06*** −2.01*** −2.42*** −2.07*** −2.08***
Informal Private 0.166† 0.240† 0.336** 0.371** 0.393**
Public Hospital 0.123 0.314† 0.411† 0.501** 0.567**
Private Hospital 0.00152 0.0613 0.116 0.143 0.162
Detailed Decomposition: Coefficient Effect
Below median expenditure −2.49 −1.91 −3.37† −2.98 −2.34
Married −4.47 −7.56† −10.5*** −9.43** −6.91†
Age (years) −17.5 −33.6 −9.07 1.53 1.35
Age squared 11.7 17.1 3.92 5.74 4.25
Male −2.97 2.61 6.48† 7.20† 4.43
Muslim −0.752 −2.63 −0.746 0.183 1.02
No education 4.61 0.904 1.84 −1.61 0.904
Unemployed adults −0486 1.17 1.62 2.42† 1.7
Rural area 4.97** 0.129 1.19 2.22 2.5
Region 0.567 1.25** 1.03** 1.08** 0.986**
Log household size −1.8 −2.9 2.96 −9.90† −14.0***
Children under 5 years 1.9 −0.0574 −0.271 0.455 0.701
Adults over 65 years −0.226 −0.0172 0.76 −0.132 0.449
Ill health −9.57*** −6.96** −1.97 0.897 1.22
Formal Public 3.84*** 2.35*** −0.316 −1.05 −1.48
Formal NGO & Missionary 0.637** 0.741** 0.405 0.497 0.635†
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in 2011) may have resulted in an underestimation of
total household expenditure in 2003. Conversely, longer
recall periods over which expenditure on inpatient
healthcare services and medicines were collected
(4 weeks in 2011 vs. 2 weeks in 2003) may have resulted
in an underestimation of total health expenditure in
2011. Although we mitigate potential bias due to differ-
ences in the degree to which goods were itemized by in-
cluding only goods and services for which data were
available in both years, we cannot rule out potential bias
arising from variations in recall periods.
Furthermore, differences in the recall periods over
which health expenditure and other household expend-
iture were collected may have affected our estimates of
the incidence of catastrophic health expenditure. House-
holds are likely to recall and accurately report health ex-
penditure occurring over a shorter recall period [53, 54].
On the other hand, expenditure on other household ex-
penditure collected over a longer recall period is likely
to have been underestimated [53, 54]. This may have re-
sulted in an overestimation of our estimates of the inci-
dence of catastrophic health expenditure.
The findings of this study illustrate an important limi-
tation of this measure of catastrophic health expend-
iture. Catastrophic health expenditure is conditional on
healthcare use and captures the financial risks associated
with accessing care. This means that the measure of
catastrophic health expenditure defined in this study
captures only financial risks for those who seek health
care but fails to account for those who do not seek
health care when ill due to an inability to pay. Although
we find some evidence that regional socioeconomic in-
equality may have accounted for higher catastrophic
health expenditure in 2011, estimates of the concentra-
tion index in 2011 suggests that in the total population,
catastrophic health expenditure was concentrated
amongst those who potentially have the ability to pay for
health care when needed. The situations where health
care is not sought due to an inability to pay or when
health care services are not available may be equally
impoverishing – for example an unresolved health prob-
lem could prevent adults in a household from working,
thus compromising household living standards. The
catastrophic health expenditure measure defined in this
study does not detect these and is an inevitably partial
measure to understanding the links between health,
health seeking behavior and impoverishment.
Conclusion
The findings of this study suggest that while efforts have
been made to address supply-side constraints to acces-
sing healthcare in the years following the conflict in Si-
erra Leone [55], financial risks faced by households
persist. This has important policy implications particu-
larly in settings transitioning out of conflict. At the end
of the conflict, efforts of the Sierra Leone government
and international donor agencies were directed towards
rebuilding health infrastructure and strengthening
supply-side functions of the health system through pol-
icies aimed at increasing the supply of health workers.
However, significant financial barriers to accessing pub-
lic health services remained and continued to worsen
the risk of household impoverishment through ill health.
For example, the reintroduction of the cost recovery
scheme in 2006 without consideration of households’
ability to pay for these services would have compromised
households’ recovery in the aftermath of the conflict.
Our results suggest that households located in the
poorer regions most affected by the conflict were more
likely to have experienced an increase of financial risk
associated with healthcare use.
While rebuilding and refurbishing destroyed health in-
frastructure (supply-side initiatives) is a crucial element to
improving access to quality healthcare services in the
aftermath of conflict, for policy-makers, this study high-
lights the importance of complementary demand-side
mechanisms aimed at protecting households, at a time
when households are themselves recovering from severe
losses. These demand-side mechanisms including health
insurance schemes and partial or full health care fee
waivers (voucher schemes and health equity funds) have
been shown to reduce out-of-pocket payments amongst
the most vulnerable populations in other settings [56]. Al-
though Sierra Leone is making efforts towards implement-
ing more equitable health care financing reforms, for
Table 5 Robustness check- Decomposing 2011–2003 change in catastrophic health expenditure at different thresholds (Continued)
Formal Private 2.73*** 1.02 −1.13 −1.28 −1.74†
Informal Private 0.00682 −0.0502 −0.307 −0.475** −0.587***
Public Hospital 0.331** 0.189 0.0993 −0.072 −0.112
Private Hospital −0.0407 −0.131† −0.183** −0.199** −0.214**
Constant −0.724 21.8 2.59 0.174 1.77
Observations 4686 4686 4686 4686 4686
†p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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example through the FHCI and the proposed national
health insurance scheme, the FHCI has been shown to
provide partial financial protection for vulnerable popula-
tions due to implementation challenges [50].
Endnotes
1The recall period differed by type of healthcare service
utilised
2At a rate of 1USD = 4349.20 Leones
3Data on visits to patent medicine vendors was collected
in 2011 only and is therefore not included in informal
health service-use.
4Only statistically significant contributions are discussed.
These are depicted graphically in Fig 1.
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